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We	must	go	beyond	the	‘backsliding	paradigm’	to
understand	what’s	happening	to	democracy	in	Central
and	Eastern	Europe
The	issue	of	democratic	backsliding	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	has	received
substantial	attention	in	recent	years,	and	many	observers	are	now	concerned	the
coronavirus	crisis	could	exacerbate	the	problem.	Licia	Cianetti	and	Seán	Hanley	write
that	while	there	are	genuine	threats	to	democracy	in	countries	like	Hungary	and	Poland,
viewing	the	entire	region	through	the	lens	of	‘backsliding’	may	obscure	more	than	it
reveals.
In	recent	years,	Central	and	Eastern	European	(CEE)	democracies	–	once	hailed	as	remarkable	success	stories	of
democratic	transformation	–	have	increasingly	attracted	media	and	academic	attention	as	cases	of	democratic
reversal.	The	consensus	is	that	democracies	across	the	region	are	in	decline	and	some	might	be	“backsliding”
towards	semi-authoritarian	hybrid	regimes	or	even	full	authoritarianism.	Since	the	election	of	illiberal	populist
governments	with	absolute	parliamentary	majorities	in	Hungary	in	2010	and	Poland	in	2015,	these	two	once	model
democratisers	are	now	seen	as	models	of	democratic	backsliding	–	a	trend	that	some	fear	may	be	turbocharged	by
the	ways	in	which	these	government	have	dealt	with	the	coronavirus	emergency.
Figure	1:	Mentions	of	‘democratic	backsliding’	in	Google	Scholar	results
Note:	Compiled	by	the	authors.
Scholarly	interest	in	the	phenomenon	of	democratic	backsliding	has	exploded	in	the	last	decade.	Although	there
has	been	much	dispute	both	over	labels	–	some	scholars	prefer	terms	like	‘democratic	erosion’	–	and	the	mix	of
causes	driving	the	process,	the	basic	contours	of	democratic	backsliding	are	widely	agreed:	it	is	gradual,	led	by
democratically-elected	governments	(often	right-wing	populist)	and	begins	with	attacks	on	constitutional	checks-
and-balances,	the	judiciary	and	media	pluralism.	The	dynamic	is,	as	Nancy	Bermeo	puts	it,	one	of	slow	but
relentless	‘executive	aggrandisement’.
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Threats	to	democracy,	especially	in	one-time	democratic	trailblazers,	are	serious,	and	merit	serious	scrutiny	and
serious	action.	There	is	a	risk,	however,	that	reading	the	entire	region	through	the	lenses	of	backsliding	may
obscure	as	much	as	it	reveals.	Indeed,	the	growing	pessimistic	consensus	about	democratic	regression	in	Central
and	Eastern	Europe	risks	repeating	–	in	reverse	–	some	of	the	same	mistakes	of	the	previous	optimistic	consensus
about	the	region’s	democratic	progress.
A	reverse	transition	paradigm?
In	2002,	Thomas	Carothers	published	a	celebrated	critique	of	what	he	termed	the	“transition	paradigm”.	He
identified	five	flawed	underlying	assumptions	that	policymakers	and	democracy	promoters	held	about
democratisation.	Chief	among	these	were	the	assumption	that	a	country	moving	away	from	authoritarianism	was	in
transition	towards	democracy	and	a	tendency	to	think	in	terms	of	a	linear	path	with	“…options	all	cast	in	terms	of
the	speed	and	direction	with	which	countries	move	on	the	path,	not	in	terms	of	movement	that	does	not	conform
with	the	path	at	all”.
He	also	questioned	an	over-focus	on	elections	as	watershed	moments	of	democratic	change	and	the
underestimation	of	the	importance	of	having	a	functioning	state	in	place.	Instead	of	asking	“how	is	the	transition
going?”	he	argued	that	analyses	should	ask	“what	is	happening	politically?”	and	sketched	two	common	real-life
scenarios	that	“transitioning”	states	were	more	likely	to	settle	into:	a	corrupt,	“feckless	pluralism”	or	more
authoritarian	“dominant	power	politics”.
Carothers’	famous	–	and	controversial	–	essay	was	in	places	overstated.	In	hindsight,	it	reads	as	a	prescient
warning	not	just	of	the	prevalence	of	‘hybrid	regimes’	manipulating	democratic	institutions	for	authoritarian	ends	in
the	post-Soviet	space	and	Africa,	but	also	of	the	weakness	of	many	supposedly	consolidated	democracies	in
Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	Many	bore	more	than	a	passing	resemblance	to	Carothers’	scenario	of	“feckless
pluralism”.	However,	more	importantly	for	the	current	debate	on	Central	and	Eastern	European	democracies,	it
serves	as	a	warning	that	we	should	not	fall	into	a	possible	“backsliding	paradigm”	with	flawed	assumptions	which
are	a	mirror	image	of	the	“transition	paradigm”.
Viktor	Orbán,	Hungarian	Prime	Minister,	meeting	with	Charles	Michel,	President	of	the	European	Council,	in	February	2020,	Credit:
European	Union
Through	this	lens,	all	democracies	in	the	region	become	potential	backsliders,	and	their	political	life	is	analysed	only
in	terms	of	the	extent	(and	forms)	of	their	“backsliding”.	Any	change	or	event	risks	ending	up	being	investigated	only
as	a	potential	signal	that	a	country	is	backsliding,	about	to	backslide,	prone	to	backsliding,	or	resilient	to
backsliding.	In	other	cases,	forms	of	(un)	democratic	change	that	may	fit	“backsliding”	only	awkwardly	such	as	the
Czech	Republic	have	been	crammed	into	a	narrative	defined	by	the	experiences	of	Hungary	and	Poland.
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However,	while	many	democracies	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	are	in	aggregate	deteriorating,	genuine
backsliders	where	democratic	fundamentals	are	in	slow	motion	free	fall	appear	the	exception	not	the	rule.	Anna
Lührmann	and	Staffan	I.	Lindberg’s	rigorous	measurement	of	“autocratisation	episodes”	using	the	V-Dem	dataset
finds	that,	of	the	EU’s	10	CEE	member	states,	only	Hungary	and	Poland	have	experienced	democratic	erosion.
Two	more	cases	(Serbia	and	North	Macedonia)	appear	if	we	add	in	the	four	CEE	candidate	states.
The	risk	of	a	“backsliding	paradigm”,	focusing	on	a	limited	number	of	worst	cases,	is	that	it	limits	our	capacity	to
think	about	the	range	of	(un)	democratic	transformation	taking	place	elsewhere	in	the	region.	To	understand	the
bulk	of	CEE	cases,	where	there	is	neither	clear	democratic	progress	nor	sharp	regress,	we	are	left	either	with	the
shaky-looking	notion	of	non-backsliding	states	being	consolidated	democracies,	or	loose	and	as	yet	under-
theorised,	residual	categories	centring	on	qualified	or	low-quality	stability,	“arrested	development”	or	stagnation.
A	paradigm	that	allows	for	only	three	possible	directions	of	travel	may	blind	us	to	trajectories	that	don’t	follow	a
linear	pattern	of	advance,	stasis	or	retreat.	Even	stagnant	does	not	mean	immobile	with	the	possibility,	for	example,
of	“near	misses”	or	“swerves”	into	and	out	of	authoritarianism;	some	archetypically	“backsliding”	phenomena	such
as	political	populism	may	be	deeply	ambiguous	in	their	effects,	particularly	those	with	a	“centrist”	anti-corruption
orientation	such	as	Slovakia’s	new	main	governing	party	OL’aNO,	while	classic	bulwarks	of	democracy	such	as
local	civil	society	can	be	harnessed	to	bolster	backsliding	and	illiberalism.
Backsliding	through	elections	only?
The	backsliding	paradigm	is	in	less	danger	of	reproducing	some	of	the	other	flaws	of	its	predecessor.	Nevertheless,
rereading	Carothers’	classic	essay	suggests	some	additional	pitfalls	to	be	avoided.
Elections	were	seen	in	the	transition	paradigm	as	being	central	–	too	central	according	to	Carothers	–	in	cementing
democratic	breakthroughs.	They	seem,	implicitly,	to	play	a	similar	watershed	role	now	in	the	emerging	backsliding
paradigm,	kickstarting	the	process	by	putting	illiberal	or	democratic	disloyal	politicians	into	power.	However,	turning
Carothers’	thinking	around,	the	election	of	such	politicians	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	backsliding	(for	example,	if
institutions	are	robust	and	checks	and	balances	too	entrenched).	At	the	same	time,	not	all	agents	of	backsliding
need	be	elected	politicians	–	corrupt	private	interests	can	capture	parties	and	institutions	warping	democracy	so
much	that	it	tips	into	a	special	kind	of	authoritarian	hybrid	regime	–	the	interpretation	Michal	Klíma	gives	of	the
decline	of	“standard”	West	European	style	party	politics	in	the	Czech	Republic.
Echoes	of	the	transition	paradigm’s	over-optimistic	underplaying	of	social-structural	determinants	can	also	be	found
in	the	emerging	reverse	transition	paradigm.	Many	accounts	of	backsliding	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	have
tended	to	dwell	on	the	immediate	political	context	such	as	electoral	volatility,	polarisation	or	the	rise	of	populist
actors	and	ideologies;	external	shocks	such	as	the	Great	Recession,	the	refugee	crisis	or	the	woes	of	the
Eurozone;	or	changes	in	external	actors’	policies	such	as	the	fading	out	of	the	EU’s	accession	conditionalities.	The
fact	that	one-time	democratic	front-runners	such	as	Hungary	and	Poland	succumbed	to	backsliding	has	tended	to
reinforce	the	view	of	backsliding	as	contagion	–	driven	by	the	rise	of	illiberal	ideas	and	unscrupulous	elites	–	that
can	spread	regardless	of	structural	conditions.
This	is	in	some	ways	unsurprising.	The	ongoing	nature	of	the	process	makes	the	backsliding	paradigm	prone	to
“presentism”,	over-focusing	on	a	limited	selection	of	current	events	at	the	expense	of	wider	historical	and	social
context.	When	it	comes	to	explanatory	factors,	many	of	the	usual	suspects	such	as	human	development,	inequality,
or	ethno-linguistic	divisions	do,	at	best,	a	patchy	job	in	distinguishing	CEE	backsliders	from	countries	with	more
variegated	patterns	of	(un)democratic	development.	The	coronavirus	crisis	stands	as	a	sobering	reminder	of	the
reality	and	power	of	exogenous	shocks.	Moreover,	as	Albert	O.	Hirschman	famously	pointed	out,	some	of	the	most
unhelpful	paradigms	are	precisely	those	which	pessimistically	see	change	as	blocked	off	by	structural	factors.
But	any	sense	that	backsliding	can	happen	anywhere	and	everywhere	–	and	perhaps	already	is	happening	–	will
need	to	be	qualified	by	a	reappraisal	of	constraining	cultural,	social	and	economic	limits	–	a	process	already
underway	in	scholarly	reassessment	of	the	rash	of	panicky	“it	could	happen	here”	reactions	to	the	election	of
Donald	Trump,	whose	authoritarian	instincts	have	damaged	but	not	derailed	American	democracy,	despite	the	fact
that	systematic	gerrymandering	of	congressional	boundaries	and	efforts	at	“voter	suppression”	make	some	key
elements	of	US	democracy	deeply	flawed.
The	limits	of	paradigms
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: We must go beyond the ‘backsliding paradigm’ to understand what’s happening to democracy in Central
and Eastern Europe
Page 3 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-04-17
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/04/17/we-must-go-beyond-the-backsliding-paradigm-to-understand-whats-happening-to-democracy-in-central-and-
eastern-europe/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
No	one	would	deny	that	processes	of	democratic	backsliding	have	taken	hold	in	countries	such	as	Hungary	and
Poland	and	some	other	Third	Wave	democracies	beyond	Europe.	But	it	is	important	not	to	look	at	the	whole	of	the
CEE	region	as	“potential	Hungaries”.	Seeing	the	entire	region	through	a	very	narrow	lens	limits	our	ability	to	make
sense	of	much	of	it.
Not	all	that	is	bad	about	democracy	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	is	an	effect	of	backsliding	or	a	sign	of	incipient
backsliding.	As	Hirschman	reminds	us,	“large-scale	social	change	typically	occurs	as	a	result	of	a	unique
constellation	of	highly	disparate	events	and	is	therefore	amenable	to	paradigmatic	thinking	only	in	a	very	special
sense.”	This	applies	both	to	CEE	states	unfortunate	enough	to	exemplify	the	backsliding	paradigm	and	to	the	less
well	reflected	upon	journeys	of	those	that	do	not.
A	longer,	fully	referenced	version	of	this	piece	has	been	uploaded	as	a	working	paper	in	the	APSA	pre-print	service
here.	The	authors	welcome	comments	and	feedback.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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